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Abstract: When a terrorist group’s aspirations far exceed the outcomes that can be expected to result from 
any of the available attack methods, an outcome below the terrorist group’s aspiration level is inevitable. A 
primary prediction of SP/A theory when applied to the study of terrorist behaviour is that when losses are 
inevitable the terrorist group will be risk averse and inclined to defer further action until expected outcomes 
improve, new attack method innovations are developed or the memory of the event that shaped aspirations 
has faded sufficiently that the aspiration level can be ‘reset’. This complements existing predictions of loss 
aversion and risk seeking behaviour over the domain of avoidable losses and provides a starting point for 
developing explanations for patterns of behaviour that are observed in the terrorism context, including 
pauses in violence, even during brutality contests, and time-lags between terrorist attacks. 
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1  Introduction
When terrorists perpetrate actions, they may be interested in different outcomes, including the number 
of injuries and fatalities that an action inflicts, the identities of particular victims, the significance of 
the attention that the action receives in the media and the responses of governments or law enforcement 
agencies. The outcomes of actions are not certain and may diverge from what was planned, aspired to 
or expected. In general, therefore, each prospective action is a risky prospect defined by its possible 
outcomes xi and their probabilities pi where (p1 + p2 + …+pn = 1). In economics and decision theory, there 
are several models of the process of ordering preferences over alternative risky prospects. These models 
include prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979), stochastic dominance (Hadar and Russell 1969; 
Hanoch and Levy 1969; Rothschild and Stiglitz 1970 & 1971; Meyer 1977a & 1977b; Levy 1992), mean-
variance analysis (Markowitz 1952) and expected utility theory (von Neumann & Morgenstern 1947) and 
its generalisations. Each of these models can be used to determine preference orderings over alternative 
terrorist actions to develop a picture of the types of decisions and patterns of behaviour that might be 
observed if terrorist behaviour is somewhat reflected in one or more of the theoretical frameworks. 
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Because each of the models is based on a theory of behaviour, a computed preference ordering can 
be complemented by a description of how a choice might be made and how choices may change as 
circumstances change. This computation-narrative duality is the core contribution that the application 
of decision theory brings to terrorism studies.
A major part of the motivation for applying models of the decision-making process to terrorist behaviour 
is the opportunity to provide analysis and explanation for observed patterns of behaviour that are often 
overlooked but which have significant implications for law enforcement and security. For example, terrorist 
groups almost never concentrate solely on one particular attack method but instead use several different 
attack methods over time or even during a single period. When attack methods are combined the expected 
outcomes improve while the risk borne by the terrorist group decreases (Phillips 2009).1 The implications 
of this are important but easily overlooked. The decision to combine different attack methods can be 
explained in terms of the advantages that derive from diversification in any context in which the payoffs 
to risky prospects are not perfectly positively correlated with each other. As Phillips (2009, 2013, 2016) has 
shown, dynamic management of and adjustment to innovations in the risk-reward trade-off motivates a 
series of behavioural patterns that are predicted and explained by the mean-variance framework. Beyond 
computing the opportunity set and determining the attack method combinations that might be preferred 
by terrorist groups with higher or lower degrees of risk aversion, a descriptive account of terrorist behaviour 
can also be developed. 
As might be expected, behavioural models such as prospect theory provide further scope for developing 
descriptions of the decision-making process in a given context as well as the capability of pure computation 
of preference orderings over alternative risky prospects. Technically, the preference orderings that emerge 
from each model diverge to the extent that particular factors or parameters are included, omitted or 
emphasised to differing degrees. Taken together, the ‘matrix’ of preference orderings derived from each 
model complement each other and show how different aspects may influence terrorist choice in some 
direction or the other. Descriptively, prospect theory includes several factors that are not included in other 
decision-making models. Phillips & Pohl (2014, 2017) have shown how the reference point concept that lies 
at the heart of prospect theory can be used to explain patterns of copycat behaviour among terrorists as well 
as ‘contest’ behaviour where terrorists or terrorist groups attempt to supersede the outcomes achieved by 
their predecessors. 
While expected utility theory and prospect theory have, understandably, attracted the most attention, 
another model of the decision-making process has quietly developed outside of the spotlight accorded to its 
better known counterparts. This is Lopes’ (1987)  SP/A theory. Similar to prospect theory in some ways and 
also exhibiting some parallels with Quiggin’s (1982) generalisation of expected utility theory, SP/A theory 
provides an interesting lens through which to view terrorist choice. The decision-maker depicted within the 
model is one who is driven by fear and hope to focus on either the security (S) afforded by some alternative 
or the potential (P) upside promised by others. Any decision that would be based on an evaluation of 
alternatives and their security-potential is impacted by the drive towards fulfilling an aspiration (A), 
so much so that aspirations can overwhelm an evaluation and lead the decision-maker to choose quite 
differently from what an assessment of payoffs and probabilities would prescribe. 
The decision-making process that is described by SP/A theory has several unique features that allow us 
to explore the role of aspirations in shaping terrorist behaviour and, in particular, the impact on choice of 
aspirations that are so high relative to the outcomes that can be expected from the available attack methods 
that an outcome that does not meet the aspiration level is inevitable. Prospect theory predicts that decision-
makers will be risk seeking in the domain of losses.2 A riskier attack method promises a greater chance of 
an outcome above the reference point, and the terrorist group will become more risk seeking as long as 
losses are still avoidable (Phillips & Pohl 2014). However, when losses are inevitable, so that there is no 
1  Simply, terrorists achieve better expected outcomes with lower risk than what we would think if we restricted our focus to 
single attack methods. 
2  Losses are outcomes that lie below the reference point or aspiration level. For example, a terrorist with a reference point of 
10 fatalities treats an outcome of 5 fatalities as a loss. 
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possibility of avoiding the loss regardless of how much risk is taken, what will the terrorist group choose 
to do? SP/A theory predicts that the terrorist group will choose to defer its action. With this insight, SP/A 
theory complements the existing application of decision theory in the terrorism context. 
2  From Orthodox Models to SP/A Theory
Despite there being several competing models of the process of decision-making under conditions of risk and 
uncertainty, there has long been a consensus that decision-makers distort the outcomes and probabilities 
of risky prospects in systematic ways. A lot of work has been directed towards developing a psychological 
explanation for this behaviour, especially the non-linear weights that decision-makers systematically apply 
to probabilities and outcomes.3 SP/A theory derives non-linear probability weighting from the ‘emotions’ 
of hope and fear rather than ‘perceptions’ and so represents a distinct behavioural model of the decision-
making process and a unique alternative to orthodox theories. Like the other behavioural models and 
generalisations of expected utility theory, SP/A theory emerged from the realisation that decision-makers 
weight probabilities in a non-linear way, something that had first come to the attention of economists 
during the 1950s as a potentially significant anomalous violation of expected utility theory. 
Being first and foremost a mathematical theory, it is not surprising that expected utility theory faced 
some early challenges in the empirical domain.4 The strongest challenges initially came from Allais (1953) 
and Ellsberg (1961) who cast doubt upon the empirical validity of the property known as ‘linearity in the 
probabilities’, a property embedded in von Neumann and Morgenstern’s independence axiom (Machina 
1987). The independence axiom states that for three lotteries, L1, L2 and L3, if the decision-maker prefers L1 
to L2, denoted by L1> L2, then for all p∈(0,1): 
pL1 + (1 ‒ p)L3 > (1 ‒ p)L3
A decision-maker whose preferences obey the independence axiom will accord equal weights to the 
probability of each possible outcome of a risky prospect. To see how a violation of this axiom may emerge 
in the terrorism context consider a terrorist who must choose between actions A and B in scenario 1 and 
between actions C and D in scenario 2:
Scenario 1:
A: certain to inflict 1 fatality; or
B: 89% chance of 1 fatality, 10% chance of 5 fatalities and 1% chance of zero fatalities
Suppose that the terrorist prefers the action, A, that will certainly inflict 1 fatality. Now consider scenario 2: 
Scenario 2:
C: 89% chance of zero fatalities, 11% chance of 1 fatality
D: 90% chance of zero fatalities, 10% chance of 5 fatalities
3  Research has also been directed towards investigating the possibility of a neurological explanation (Berns et al. 2008). In 
this regard, it is interesting to note the systematic behaviour found to characterise animals’ choices over uncertain outcomes 
(Battalio et al. 1985).  
4  Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1947) expected utility theory, derived on the basis of the axioms of completeness, transiti-
vity, continuity and independence, is the traditional theory of rational decision-making under risk and uncertainty. The theory 
says that decision-makers consider outcomes and the utility or satisfaction they associate with each outcome. Von Neumann 
and Morgenstern proved that there exists a class of functions that transforms outcomes into utility numbers in a manner that 
preserves the decision-maker’s underlying preference structure. The utilities are weighted by the probability that the outcome 
will occur and summed over all outcomes to obtain the expected utility for a risky prospect. Risky prospects are compared on 
the basis of expected utility and the one with the highest expected utility number will be selected (or should be selected, depen-
ding on whether the theory is interpreted as predictive or prescriptive). See Ellsberg (1954) for further exposition and Fishburn 
(1989) for a ‘retrospective’ review. Fishburn’s (1989, p.138) comments on the independence axiom are noteworthy.
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Suppose that the same terrorist now prefers the action D. This pair of choices, A and D, violates the 
independence axiom.5 This type of behaviour implies that rather than treat each probability for each 
outcome as being equally important, decision-makers underweight large probabilities and overweight small 
probabilities (Allais 1953; Ellsberg 1961; Lopes 1987; Tversky & Kahneman 1992; Camerer & Ho 1994; Wu & 
Gonzalez 1996; Prelec 1998; Gonzalez & Wu 1999; Abdellaoui 2000; Bruhin et al. 2010). In the terrorism 
context, therefore, terrorists are likely to accord greater weight to unlikely outcomes and less weight to more 
likely outcomes. Rather than the probability, pi, of each outcome, xi, entering directly into the terrorist’s 
decision-making process, a more accurate description of the terrorist’s decision-making process is one 
in which the probabilities of outcomes are themselves weighted or transformed by some function w(p) 
to reflect the systematic underweighting of large probabilities and overweighting of small probabilities.6 
Although an exact specification of the probability weighting function is still the subject of ongoing research 
it is clear that any such function must be non-linear and (inverse) S-shaped, as depicted in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: The (Inverse) S-Shaped Probability Weighting Function
Once it became clear that the unequal weighting of probabilities by decision-makers was systematic, 
research in psychology and economics responded by turning in two main directions.7 Along one path, 
efforts were made to incorporate non-linear functions of probabilities into the model (Machina 1987, 
Starmer 2000). Generalisations of expected utility theory have demonstrated that it does not rely upon 
the independence axiom if preferences are ‘smooth’ (Machina 1982), reversed the roles of payoffs and 
probabilities (Yaari 1987), and developed the concepts of expected utility (Quiggin 1982) and non-additive 
probabilities (Schmiedler 1989). Along the other path, new behavioural models were developed, most 
prominently prospect theory (PT, Kahneman & Tversky 1979) and cumulative prospect theory (CPT, Tversky 
& Kahneman 1992). CPT extends PT to deal with risky prospects with multiple outcomes under conditions of 
5  To see how this pair of choices A and D is inconsistent, it is helpful to break A into two parts (89% chance of 1 fatality and 11% 
chance of 1 fatality). Now the 89% chance in A and B cancel out. If the decision-maker chooses A, the revealed preference is for 
an 11% chance of 1 fatality over a 10% chance of 5 fatalities and 1% of zero fatalities. In the second scenario D can also be broken 
down into 89% chance of zero fatalities, 1% chance of zero fatalities and 10% chance of 5 fatalities. Viewed in this way, we can 
see that once the common elements are cancelled out, option A is the same as option C and option B is the same as option D. To 
choose A (or B) and then choose D (or C) is inconsistent. 
6  There is a clear distinction between weighted or transformed probabilities or ‘decision weights’ and the probabilities them-
selves. Kahneman and Tversky (1979, p. 280) stress, “…decision weights are not probabilities: they do not obey the probability 
axioms [of Kolmogorov (1933)] and they should not be interpreted as measures of degree of belief”.
7  A related, but arguably distinct, direction is the development of ‘regret theory’ (Bell 1982; Loomes & Sugden 1982). 
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both risk and uncertainty while preserving stochastic dominance.8 While CPT incorporates several aspects 
of the decision-making process that are overlooked by expected utility theory (including loss aversion, 
reference point dependence, diminishing sensitivity, risk seeking in the domain of losses, and risk aversion 
in the domain of gains), each ranks alternative risky prospects using a single statistic (expected utility or 
prospect value), obtained by evaluating risky prospects via a utility function.  
Expected utility theory, CPT and stochastic dominance have all been applied to the analysis of terrorist 
choice (Landes 1978; Sandler et al. 1983; Phillips 2009; Phillips & Pohl 2014; Phillips & Pohl 2017).9 Compared 
to these models, SP/A theory is distinct with regard to the explanation it offers for non-linear probability 
weighting and in terms of the criteria that the SP/A decision-maker applies to the evaluation and selection 
of risky prospects. SP/A theory depicts the choice from among alternative risky prospects as an increasing 
function of the two separate criteria, security-potential (SP) and aspiration level (A):
SP/A = f[SP, A].
The security-potential (SP) criterion is the result of a process of evaluating outcomes and probabilities. 
The aspiration (A) criterion is simply the probability that a risky prospect will yield an outcome equal to 
the aspiration level or higher. The SP/A decision-maker considers both criteria in reaching a final decision. 
This model of the decision-making process has found application in modern theoretical developments in 
behavioural economics, especially the development of behavioural portfolio theory (Shefrin & Statman 
2000; Das et al. 2010). Like CPT, in SP/A theory decision-makers weight the probabilities unequally in 
the manner that we have discussed above. Also like CPT, an aspiration level or reference point plays a 
role in shaping the SP/A decision-maker’s assessment. As Lopes (2013) points out, the decision-maker is 
focussed on the probability of achieving an outcome at least as large as the aspiration level. The aspiration 
level, as well as being a reference point concept, is also a ‘threshold’ concept designed to reflect decision-
makers’ desires to gain ‘at least’. Thresholds are reminiscent of ‘safety first’ principles (Roy 1952; Telser 
1956; Kataoka 1963) and play an important role in mental accounting (Shefrin & Statman 2000; Das et al. 
2010). Unlike CPT, SP/A theory allows a decision-maker to assess a risky prospect in three different ways: (1) 
security-minded; (2) potential-minded; or (3) ‘cautiously optimistic’ (Lopes & Oden 1999). Most importantly, 
the aspiration level is not incorporated into the decision-maker’s value or utility function, but rather is 
distinct and may either reinforce or override the  SP assessment of a risky prospect. 
Whereas Tversky & Kahneman (1992) explain their non-linear probability weighting function in 
terms of diminishing sensitivity, SP/A theory develops an alternative psychological explanation which, 
resembling Quiggin’s (1982) optimism-pessimism dichotomy, is based on the concepts of ‘diminishing 
attention’, ‘security-mindedness’ and ‘potential-mindedness’. In Figure 2, probabilities are decumulative 
(Lopes & Oden 1999). They represent the probability of achieving at least the associated outcome, ranked 
from worst possible (e.g. at least zero fatalities with probability 1) to the best possible (e.g. at least a number 
of fatalities higher than the maximum possible with probability zero) moving from right to left. The convex 
(concave) function in Figure 2 shows the probability weights accorded by a security-minded (potential-
minded) decision-maker. Weighting is shaped by the amount of attention that the decision-maker gives 
to different outcomes. The security-minded decision-maker pays more attention to the worst outcomes. 
The potential-minded decision-maker pays more attention to the best outcomes. The (inverse) S-shaped 
weighting function shows the probability weights accorded by a cautiously optimistic decision-maker 
whose attention is somewhat divided between best and worst outcomes depending on just how cautious he 
or she happens to be. 
8  Tversky & Kahneman (1992) are in fact dismissive of stochastic dominance, and indeed Birnbaum et al. (1999) have highligh-
ted the frequency with which decision-makers violate stochastic dominance. 
9  Utility theory, which is a logical but not mathematical theory of choice under conditions of certainty, has long been applied 
to the economic analysis of terrorism. For example, see Enders & Sandler (2002) or Frey & Luechinger (2003). 
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Figure 2: Security-Mindedness, Potential-Mindedness and Cautious Optimism
As with prospect theory (Barberis 2013), the psychological explanations for non-linear probability weighting 
in SP/A theory represent decision weights rather than erroneous beliefs, meaning that the decision-maker 
understands the tails of the probability distribution. As Lopes (2013, p.7) explains, the probability weights 
do not “reflect errors in assessing probabilities. Instead, they only suppose that people’s values for security 
or potential can be expressed by how much attention is paid to the various regions of the lottery”. The 
decision-maker overweights and underweights, but understands, the tails of the probability distribution. 
This is so for any distribution (Barberis 2013).10
3  The Formal Structure of SP/A  Theory
SP/A theory, then, is a behavioural model that aims to describe how decision-makers choose from among 
alternative risky prospects. The main points are: (1) decision-makers weight probabilities non-linearly; 
(2) the decision model that encompasses these individual and situational variables is characterised by 
two criteria: security-potential (SP) and aspiration (A); (3) the decision-maker’s choice is an increasing 
function of the combined criteria, SP/A = f[SP, A]; and (4) the aspiration level may reinforce or override 
the SP assessment. To see how these features work to shape decision-making, we present a short formal 
discussion of SP/A theory. 
The SP component is where the decision-maker evaluates each prospect on the basis of its expected 
outcomes and the degree of uncertainty that characterises them (Lopes 1995; Lopes & Oden 1999; Rieger 
2010).11 Simply, the utility of each outcome is weighted by a non-linear decision weight and the sum is taken 
over all outcomes to arrive at the SP evaluation:
 
SP = ∑i(h(Di ) ‒ h(Di+1 ))u(xi)
10  Regardless of the nature of the distribution that shapes outcomes, the decision-maker might be able to introduce skewness 
by adopting various strategies (Barberis 2013). 
11  This can also be expressed as a Lebesgue-Stieltjes integral of the following form (He & Zhou 2013), where FX (∙) is the cumu-
lative distribution function of X: V(X)=∫0+∞ xd[‒w(1‒FX(x))]
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Here Di=∑Nn=ipn is the decumulative probability,  u(xi) is a concave utility function and h(D) is a non-
linear decumulative weighting function that takes the form (Lopes & Oden 1999, p.290):
h(D)=wDqs+1 + (1‒w)[1‒(1‒D)qp+1 ].
Here the parameters qs≥0, qp≥0 and 0 ≤ w ≤ 1 reflect a decision-maker’s security-mindedness, potential-
mindedness or cautious optimism respectively. In terms of Figure 2, these parameters determine convexity, 
concavity or (inverse) ‘S-shaped-ness’, respectively. The function wDqs+1 is convex and reflects security-
mindedness. The function 1‒(1‒D)qp+1  is concave and reflects potential-mindedness. If the decision-maker 
is completely security-minded, w = 1. If the decision-maker is completely potential-minded, w = 0. Cautious-
optimism is reflected by 0 < w < 1. As the assessment of the possible outcomes proceeds either from the best 
to worst outcomes (potential-minded) or from the worst to best outcomes (security-minded), the decision-
maker pays less attention to successive outcomes at rates qs and qp. Most decision-makers combine aspects 
of both security-mindedness and potential-mindedness. That is, they are cautiously optimistic to some 
degree. 
Significant evidence has been gathered to support the conclusion that decision-makers are reluctant 
(keen) to take actions that entail the likelihood of failure (success) measured with respect to an aspiration 
(Diecidue & van de Ven 2008). By keeping the A criterion distinct, SP/A theory allows aspirations to 
reinforce or override other dimensions of the decision-maker’s preferences. When the aspiration level is 
low relative to the range of likely outcomes, aspirations reinforce security-mindedness. When aspirations 
are high relative to the range of likely outcomes, aspirations reinforce potential-mindedness. However, 
when aspirations are so high that an outcome below the aspiration level is inevitable, aspirations override 
potential-mindedness and reinforce security-mindedness.12 This subtle treatment emerges from what is a 
very basic technical feature of SP/A theory. Formally, the A component is simply the likelihood that the risky 
prospect will yield outcomes equal to or greater than an aspiration level, α:
A = p (x ≥ α).
If there are just two prospects, i and j, possible outcomes of the decision-making process include: 
(1) if i and j both have the same likelihood of generating x ≥ α, the prospect with the higher SP value will be 
selected; (2) if i has both the higher SP value and the higher A value, then i will clearly be favoured; (3) if i 
has a slightly higher SP value than j but fails to meet the aspiration level while j, although having a slightly 
lower SP value does meet the aspiration level, then j would be selected over i; (4) if i has a much higher SP 
value than j but fails to meet the aspiration level while j has a much lower SP value than i but does meet the 
aspiration level, the SP/A assessments contradict each other. In this case, either i or j might be selected; (5) 
if it is certain that i will generate an outcome that meets the aspiration level while it is uncertain that j will 
generate such an outcome, i would be selected over j; (6) if there is no possibility that the aspiration level 
will be met by either  i  or j, the decision-maker would prefer to avoid both prospects. 
As an example, consider a cautiously optimistic terrorist decision-maker with w=0.6, qs = 4 and  qp = 4 
who must choose between two alternative (hypothetical) terrorist actions, i and j where the decumulative 
probabilities for each of the actions are presented in Table 1. Action i has a lower expected outcome of 15 
fatalities and less variability or risk (3 fatalities) while action j has a higher expected outcome of 20 fatalities 
with more variability or risk (4 fatalities). Variability or risk does not enter directly into the decision-making 
framework but it does shape the distribution of outcomes. For each action, the worst possible outcome 
is zero fatalities. For action i, the best possible outcome is 35 fatalities and for action j the best possible 
outcome is 45 fatalities. The cautiously optimistic decision-maker’s SP  value for  i=0.6703 whilst the 
corresponding value for j = 0.9061. If the aspiration level α = 15, it can be seen from Table 1 that j provides a 
12  Using the terminology of prospect theory, the aspiration level reinforces risk aversion over the domain of gains and rein-
forces loss aversion over the domain of losses. Unlike prospect theory, reinforcing loss aversion over the domain of losses may 
generate risk seeking or risk aversion depending on the magnitude of the losses being considered. 
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greater possibility of achieving at least the aspiration level (0.89 versus 0.50). Since it has both the higher 
SP value and the higher A value, j will be preferred. 
When the security-mindedness or potential-mindedness of the terrorist decision-maker changes, it is 
possible that a different action may be preferred on the basis of the SP  assessment. Because its outcomes 
are less variable, action i is less risky than action j. It should not be surprising to find that if the decision-
maker is completely security-minded (w = 1), i becomes the action with the higher SP  value. When this 
is the case, the SP  value for i = 0.1747 whilst the corresponding value for j = 0.1526. If the aspiration level 
remains at α = 15, the SP evaluation favours i but j is still much more likely to fulfil the decision-maker’s 
aspirations. As such, the decision-maker would choose j despite the higher risk. Just as in prospect theory, 
the decision-maker takes more risk to avoid a loss. However, when aspirations reach such a high level 
that neither prospect has any possibility of producing an outcome that exceeds the aspiration level, the 
decision-maker would prefer to avoid both prospects. In this case, aspirations reinforce loss aversion but 
do so against the backdrop of risk aversion.  
Table 1: Outcomes and Decumulative Probabilities, Hypothetical Actions
Outcomes, Worst to Best
(Expected Fatalities)
Decumulative Probability
(i)
Decumulative Probability
(j)
At least… 0 fatalities 1 1
1 0.9999985 0.9999990
2 0.9999927 0.9999966
3 0.9999683 0.9999893
4 0.9998771 0.9999683
5 0.9995709 0.9999116
6 0.9986501 0.9997674
7 0.9961696 0.9994230
8 0.9901847 0.9986501
9 0.9772499 0.9970202
10 0.9522096 0.9937903
11 0.9087888 0.9877755
12 0.8413447 0.9772499
13 0.7475075 0.9599408
14 0.6305587 0.9331928
15 0.5000000 0.8943502
16 0.3694413 0.8413447
17 0.2524925 0.7733726
18 0.1586553 0.6914625
19 0.0912112 0.5987063
20 0.0477904 0.5000000
… … …
35 0.0000 0.0062097
… 0.0000 …
At least 45 fatalities 0.0000 0.0000
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4  SP/A Theory and Terrorist Attack Method Choice
In perpetrating a terrorist action, terrorist groups choose an attack method or combination of attack 
methods. This is one of the choices that can be analysed from the perspective of decision theory. Although 
the specific nature of a terrorist action is unique, the choice of attack method must initially be made from 
a relatively small set of commonly deployed actions. These are reflected in the categories that constitute 
databases such as the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). Each attack method is characterised by an 
average or expected number of fatalities and a standard deviation that indicates the possibility that the 
actual outcome of any single instance will diverge from what was expected. Table 2 shows that the attacks 
perpetrated during 2016 are characterised by a risk-reward trade-off across methods: greater chances that 
the actual outcome will diverge from what was expected are associated with better expected outcomes. 
Table 2: Attack Methods 2016, Least Risky to Most Risky13
Attack Method Number of Incidents Average Fatalities Per Attack Standard Deviation of Outcomes
Hijacking 41 1.14 1.79
Assassination 779 2.32 6.11
Hostage-Taking 1,086 2.38 6.64
Armed Assault 2,579 2.68 9.51
Bombing 6,655 2.69 9.54
Facility/Infrastructure 654 3.60 15.70
Unarmed Assault 64 5.96 20.23
Orthodox expected utility theory predicts that the terrorist group will choose the attack method with the highest 
expected utility, though not necessarily the highest expected value. In Table 2, unarmed assault has the highest 
expected value but also the most variable outcomes.14 A risk averse decision-maker trades off higher expected 
outcomes with greater risk. Depending on the nature of the terrorist group’s utility function and, in particular, 
the level of risk aversion, the attack method with the highest expected outcomes may not be assigned the highest 
expected utility. For example, a relatively risk seeking decision-maker with preferences described by logarithmic 
utility prefers unarmed assault. For a more risk averse decision-maker whose preferences are described by 
‘power’ utility, hijacking is the preferred attack method followed by assassination, hostage-taking and unarmed 
assault.15 Applying utility theory avoids incorrectly concluding that all terrorists will prefer the attack method 
with the highest expected outcomes. Observed choices are more diverse than this. 
Furthermore, terrorist groups often combine several different attack methods over time, which has 
important implications for the expected payoffs that accrue to a terrorist group and the risks that the group 
had to bear to obtain them. Mean-variance (portfolio) analysis is well suited to analysing this situation. The 
method simplifies the decision calculus to an assessment of alternatives based on the expected payoff and 
standard deviation, U=f(μ,σ). When combinations of risky prospects are considered, the opportunity set 
can be calculated in such a way that the standard deviation of individual prospects is accounted for as well 
as the correlation of the outcomes between different risky prospects. The risk-reward trade-off that emerges 
is positive, as reflected in the individual prospects listed in Table 2. However, when correlation is taken into 
account the risk-reward trade-off is also found to be concave, producing higher expected payoffs at each 
level of risk than would be available if combining attack methods was not possible. 
13  There were 915 attacks where the attack method is listed as ‘unknown’. These have not been included.
14  This is the category under which the GTD records ‘vehicle attacks’ where the terrorist uses a vehicle to inflict fatalities on 
civilians. In all previous years, this category has had a much lower average outcome (less than 1 fatality per attack).
15  This is with the risk aversion coefficient set to 3, the mid-range of the 1 to 5 commonly accepted values. In contrast, the 
logarithmic utility risk aversion coefficient equals 1 by construction.
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The concave curve in Figure 3 is the opportunity set consisting of all possible combinations that can 
be formed from the available attack methods. The decision-maker’s choice of combination depends on the 
degree to which the decision-maker is risk averse. Combinations that have lower risk are located in the 
lower left of the opportunity set. Combinations that have higher risk are located in the upper right of the 
opportunity set. Low (high) risk combinations can each contain high (low) risk individual attack methods. 
That is, a lower risk combination may still be constituted to some degree by the highest risk attack method 
and vice versa. However, for the most part, lower (higher) risk combinations will be more heavily weighted 
towards lower (higher) risk individual attack methods. In Figure 3, therefore, a more risk averse terrorist 
group would choose an attack method combination from the lower left of the set and that combination 
would be more heavily constituted by lower risk attack methods. A less risk averse terrorist group would 
choose an attack method combination from the upper right of the set and that combination would be more 
heavily constituted by higher risk attack methods. 
Figure 3: Mean-Variance Analysis, Opportunities and Choices
Together, expected utility theory and mean-variance analysis can provide explanations for patterns of 
behaviour involving individual risky prospects and combinations of them and incorporate factors such 
as expected outcomes, risk, risk preference and correlation structure into formal frameworks that can be 
used to better understand terrorist choice. These advances can be augmented considerably by exploring the 
ways in which behavioural models of the decision-making process apply in the terrorism context. Prospect 
theory is the most well-known descriptive-behavioural model of the decision-making process. In addition 
to providing a method for computing preference orderings that reflect a number of aspects of observed 
behaviour that are not represented in expected utility theory or mean-variance analysis, prospect theory 
provides a richer framework for developing insights into the actual decision-making process. Much of 
the innovation that prospect theory represented is encompassed in its S-shaped utility function (Figure 
4), which depicts a reference point, a domain of losses in which the decision-maker is risk seeking and a 
domain of gains in which the decision-maker is risk averse. 
In prospect theory, the reference point is a critical part of the evaluation process. The terrorist decision-
maker chooses an attack method based on an evaluation in which the outcomes of a predecessor or a rival 
are accorded a great deal of significance and shape the attack method choice considerably. The reference 
point determines the domain of gains and losses and influences the relative attractiveness of alternative 
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attack methods.16 Importantly, if the terrorist group’s reference point is high relative to average outcomes 
that are usually generated by the attack methods listed in Table 2, the terrorist group confronts a relatively 
broad domain of losses. The opposite is true for reference points that are low relative to the average outcomes 
of the available attack methods. For example, consider a reference point of 25 fatalities. Given the average 
and standard deviation of the attack methods listed in Table 2, reaching this reference point will not be easy 
and most outcomes are expected to lie below it. Conversely, a reference point of just 2 fatalities falls much 
more within the likely reach of a terrorist group using any one of the available attack methods. 
Figure 4: The S-Shaped Utility Function of Prospect Theory
Prospect theory predicts two main types of behaviour. In the first instance, in the domain of avoidable 
losses the terrorist group will be risk seeking and choose an attack method with higher and more variable 
outcomes. As the reference point increases, the terrorist group must take more risk to generate a possibility 
of an outcome above the reference point and avoid incurring a loss. In the second instance, risk aversion 
over the domain of gains predicts that the terrorist group will choose the least risky attack method that still 
provides an attractive likelihood of generating an outcome in excess of the reference point. This may or may 
not be the attack method with the lowest level of risk, but it will certainly not be the attack method with the 
most variable outcomes. 
SP/A theory complements prospect theory by allowing us to analyse decision-making in the domain 
of inevitable losses. In choosing an attack method, the terrorist group may hold such lofty aspirations 
relative to the possible outcomes that it confronts inevitable (unavoidable) losses. Even the choice of the 
riskiest attack method will fail to produce an outcome that exceeds aspirations. As discussed, prospect 
theory generally predicts risk seeking in the domain of losses. Because the utility function of SP/A theory 
is allowed to undulate over the domain of gains and losses, different preferences may dominate over 
different ranges of outcomes and probabilities and the decision-maker may switch from being risk averse 
to being risk seeking and back to risk averse as gains and losses of varying magnitudes are considered. 
Rather than simply providing a point of inflection that partitions the domain of gains and the domain of 
losses, the aspiration level in SP/A theory actively shapes the utility function by reinforcing or overriding 
aspects of the decision-maker’s preferences, especially loss aversion. When aspirations are low relative to 
16  Phillips & Pohl (2014, 2017) explored the implications for terrorist choice when the reference point is an outcome achieved 
by another terrorist.
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expected outcomes, aspirations reinforce risk aversion over the domain of gains. When aspirations are high 
relative to the expected outcomes, aspirations reinforce loss aversion. However, whereas high aspirations 
reinforce risk seeking when losses are still avoidable, aspirations instead override risk seeking to generate 
risk aversion, and thus the deferral of action, when they are sufficiently high to make losses inevitable. 
Formally, the pattern of decision-making that we can expect is depicted by the type of utility functions 
discussed by Bosch-Doménech & Silvestre (2006), Diecidue & van de Ven (2008) and Rieger (2010). We 
can draw a SP/A utility function that splices a concave (risk averse) segment onto the lower left end of the 
prospect theory’s S-shaped utility function, corresponding to the domain of inevitable losses. The resultant 
undulating utility function is drawn in Figure 5.
Figure 5: SP/A-CPT Concave-Convex-Concave Utility function 
SP/Atheory provides a theoretical explanation, drawn from foundational concepts of decision theory, 
for observations of risk averse behaviour and attack deferral when inflicted brutality or another relevant 
payoff rises to very high levels relative to the outcomes expected from the available attack methods. Before 
this point is reached, attacks take place at varying intervals. The average of these intervals, however, is 
predicted to be much shorter in duration than the deferral period that follows once the point of inevitable 
losses is reached. This is not a macro-level prediction but a prediction of a pattern of behaviour that should 
be expected within particular ‘contests’ when terrorist groups are referencing each other’s actions. 
There are no existing empirical studies of SP/A theory in a terrorism context, but some elements of the 
predicted patterns of behaviour can be found in the results of studies of terrorist contests. For example, 
Caruso & Schneider (2013) studied contests between jihadist groups. The authors found strong positive 
correlation in the number of victims of terrorist attacks over time, indicating the type of referencing 
behaviour that we would expect. They also found variable time lags between attacks in each series. From 
such a starting point, it is reasonable to expect empirical work that draws specifically on SP/A theory to 
extend our understanding of contest behaviour among terrorist groups. 
The predictions of SP/A theory should also hold when the desired outcome is not fatalities but media 
attention. The historical record of terrorism contains examples of groups that are known to have been 
involved in contests with each other, referenced each other’s behaviour and competed for publicity without 
necessarily maximising the number of fatalities that were inflicted. An important example occurred in 
Germany during the 1970s. Two groups in particular were known to have been competing with each other 
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for prominence: the Red Army Faction (RAF) and the 2nd of June Movement.17 As a first step towards an 
empirical analysis of the predictions of SP/A theory, we catalogued each attack perpetrated by these two 
groups for the period January 1970 to December 1979. There were 41 attacks in total. For each attack, we 
counted the total media coverage (measured in column inches, c”) from the first reporting day following 
an event until no further reporting took place in each of three major daily newspapers: Bild-Zeitung, 
Süddeutsche-Zeitung and Die Welt. We have singled out a sub-period during which there was a ‘back-and-
forth’ of attacks between the groups. This is the period from early 1974 to mid-1978. 
The information is summarised by Table 3 which starts with an action by the RAF. It had been 45 days 
since the previous action. The next action in the series was by the 2nd of June Movement which took place 
73 days later. The steady back-and-forth of actions between these two rival groups is punctuated by three 
significant pauses following: (1) the 2nd of June Movement’s action on 27 February 1975 (the kidnapping of 
Peter Lorenz); (2) the RAF’s action on 7 April 1977 (the assassination of Siegfried Buback); and (3) the run 
of actions by the RAF culminating with the action perpetrated on 5 September 1977 (the kidnapping and 
murder of Hanns Martin Schleyer). The Schleyer murder is also the culmination of the ‘German Autumn’. 
We would expect each of these actions, which were followed by significant pauses, to have been actions 
that received very large amounts of media coverage. This is what we find. Although this is by no means an 
empirical verification of SP/A theory and the conclusions that we have drawn from applying the model to 
the terrorism context, it is a pattern of behaviour that is consistent with the predictions that emerge from 
the theory and a promising prelude to a more detailed empirical investigation.
Table 3: Actions Perpetrated by the Red Army Faction and the 2nd of June Movement, Germany
Date of Action Perpetrator Media Attention, c”
(Bild-Zeitung)
Media Attention, 
c”
(Süddeutsche-
Zeitung)
Media Attention, 
c”
(Die Welt)
Total Media 
Attention, c”
Days 
Between 
Attacks
24/03/1974 RAF 0 0 0 45
5/06/1974 2nd of June Movement 0 0 0 73
26/08/1974 2nd of June Movement 0 1.84 0 1.84 82
20/11/1974 RAF 71.31 0 59.28 130.59 86
30/01/1975 RAF 0 0 0 0.00 71
27/02/1975 2nd of June Movement 3914.67 1681.77 2759.89 8356.33 28
16/10/1975 RAF 2.87 0 7.8 10.67 231
18/06/1976 2nd of June Movement 0 0 0 0.00 246
4/09/1976 RAF 0 0 3.25 3.25 78
10/11/1976 2nd of June Movement 40.93 0 0 40.93 67
8/01/1977 RAF 0 0 0 0.00 59
7/04/1977 RAF 772.65 679.88 1164.75 2617.28 89
30/07/1977 RAF 663.77 714.07 1188.46 2566.30 114
25/08/1977 RAF 121.21 143.52 192.09 456.82 26
05/09/1977 RAF 6118.37 6413.21 6141.41 18672.99 11
27/05/1978 2nd of June Movement 425.71 0 0 425.71 264
17  Quotes from RAF members that support this can be found in Phillips & Pohl (2014). Also see Pohl (2015) and, especially, 
Pohl (2017). 
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5  Concluding Remarks
Encompassing the different dimensions of terrorist decision-making, including the choice to defer action, 
within a coherent overarching framework is a task towards which each of the extant models of decision-
making under conditions of risk and uncertainty contributes its perspective and its particular piece of the 
puzzle. SP/A theory highlights and offers an explanation for certain aspects of observed terrorist behaviour 
that have yet to be adequately treated. Pauses in violence, even during brutal contests, emerge as predicted 
behaviour within the SP/A  decision-making process when it is applied to terrorist choice. Whenever 
aspirations formed on the basis of the outcomes of previous actions are so high relative to the expected 
outcomes of the available alternatives that a loss is inevitable, aspirations reinforce security-mindedness 
and loss aversion and override any tendency towards risk seeking behaviour. Together, SP/A theory and 
prospect theory describe patterns of behaviour over the range of outcomes which, relative to an aspiration 
level, constitute inevitable losses, avoidable losses and gains. 
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